<jsquarek@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:002ee2c3-42d7-427d-90cf-26b258dd7da7@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Spinoza uses this phrase extensively, and I find
> it translated and interpreted in a variety of ways.
> Apparently "species" is the acc. plural of the
> 5th declension. (I believe that, strictly speaking,
> there is no acc. pl for "species", but that Spinoza
> means the acc. pl anyway in his usages)
> That means that "sub" should
> only have the meanings which syntactically
> call for the accusative case. That should be a clue
> in figuring out which of the many, many meanings
> of "species" Spinoza meant to be using.
>
> A straight forward translation would be
>
> "under the forms of Eternity"
>
> but, altho that is correct in terms of the Latin
> per se, I don't really like it in terms of the rest
> of what Spinoza seems to be up to. I am
> inclined more toward those meanings which
> are cognate to "aspect", "looking", etc.
>
> So....
>
> does anyone have something to say as to
> what Spinoza meant with his uses of the
> phrase "sub species aeternitatis"?
>
>
>
COROLLARIUM II: De natura rationis est res sub quadam æternitatis specie
percipere.
DEMONSTRATIO: De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut
contingentes contemplari (per propositionem præcedentem). Hanc autem
rerum necessitatem (per propositionem 41 hujus) vere hoc est (per axioma
6 partis I) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per propositionem 16 partis I)
hæc rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei æternæ naturæ necessitas; ergo de
natura rationis est res sub hac æternitatis specie contemplari. Adde
quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per propositionem 38 hujus) quæ
illa explicant quæ omnibus communia sunt quæque (per propositionem 37
hujus) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant quæque propterea
absque ulla tem****is relatione sed sub quadam æternitatis specie debent
concipi. Q.E.D.
Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a
certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie).
Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this
necessity of things (II. xli.) truly,--that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it is in
itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very necessity of
the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to
regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of
reason are the notions (II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to
all, and which (II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any
particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation
to time, under a certain form of eternity.
*****************
Ed
|
